After being suitably shamed by at least a couple friends for never having read this important work, I am now "A real American" ... all be it sadly one that lives in BOistan because the major bulwark which the authors of the Federalist assumed would keep us free has lost interest in history, culture, and just plain thinking "reasonably hard". I refer of course to "We The People".
At the time Madison, Hamilton and Jay wrote the Federalist, it was published in NEWSPAPERS, and the general reading public was able to read these fairly weighty texts which assume at least a passing familarity with the history of Greece, Rome and Europe. (we will see that in the Federalist 45 quote later)
At the time these papers were written, "We The People" were better educated in things that matter (history, theology, philosophy, morality, literature, etc), and MUCH more interested in the real work of self government that a REPUBLIC required. They were completely aware that they absolutely did not want "democracy", because they understood it to be simply mob rule -- and they knew WHY!
Here is a famous Madison quote from Federalist 51 on the separation of powers ...
“It may be a reflection on human nature, that such devices [checks and balances] should be necessary to control the abuses of government. But what is government itself, but the greatest of all reflections on human nature? If men were angels, no government would be necessary. If angels were to govern men, neither external nor internal controls on government would be necessary. In framing a government which is to be administered by men over men, the great difficulty lies in this: you must first enable the government to control the governed; and in the next place oblige it to control itself. A dependence on the people is, no doubt, the primary control on the government; but experience has taught mankind the necessity of auxiliary precautions.”
Note the dependence on the people as the PRIMARY control on government. Now look at this from 47 -- "The accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the same hands, whether of one, a few, or may, and whether hereditary, self appointed, or elective, may justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny."
Madison understood the danger of the Administrative / Deep State well in advance of their construction. Who can fire Robert Mueller? The President? Congress? Apparently nobody -- all the powers in a single person, accountable to nobody. Likewise IRS, FBI, CIA, etc. The authors of the Federalist assumed that "We The People" ... (the ones they were writing to), would always be educated in history, etc (listed above), AND have a huge interest in LIMITING the power of the Federal Government. They were wrong.
Here we see another broken assumption from Federalist 45 -- the assumption that the power of the state governments would be retained, and that the states would act as a "check" on the Federal ...
We have seen, in all the examples of ancient and modern confederacies, the strongest tendency continually betraying itself in the members, to despoil the general government of its authorities, with a very ineffectual capacity in the latter to defend itself against the encroachments. Although, in most of these examples, the system has been so dissimilar from that under consideration as greatly to weaken any inference concerning the latter from the fate of the former, yet, as the States will retain, under the proposed Constitution, a very extensive portion of active sovereignty, the inference ought not to be wholly disregarded. In the Achaean league it is probable that the federal head had a degree and species of power, which gave it a considerable likeness to the government framed by the convention. The Lycian Confederacy, as far as its principles and form are transmitted, must have borne a still greater analogy to it. Yet history does not inform us that either of them ever degenerated, or tended to degenerate, into one consolidated government. On the contrary, we know that the ruin of one of them proceeded from the incapacity of the federal authority to prevent the dissensions, and finally the disunion, of the subordinate authorities. These cases are the more worthy of our attention, as the external causes by which the component parts were pressed together were much more numerous and powerful than in our case; and consequently less powerful ligaments within would be sufficient to bind the members to the head, and to each other.
In the feudal system, we have seen a similar propensity exemplified. Notwithstanding the want of proper sympathy in every instance between the local sovereigns and the people, and the sympathy in some instances between the general sovereign and the latter, it usually happened that the local sovereigns prevailed in the rivalship for encroachments. Had no external dangers enforced internal harmony and subordination, and particularly, had the local sovereigns possessed the affections of the people, the great kingdoms in Europe would at this time consist of as many independent princes as there were formerly feudatory barons. The State government will have the advantage of the Federal government, whether we compare them in respect to the immediate dependence of the one on the other; to the weight of personal influence which each side will possess; to the powers respectively vested in them; to the predilection and probable support of the people; to the disposition and faculty of resisting and frustrating the measures of each other. The State governments may be regarded as constituent and essential parts of the federal government; whilst the latter is nowise essential to the operation or organization of the former. Without the intervention of the State legislatures, the President of the United States cannot be elected at all. They must in all cases have a great share in his appointment, and will, perhaps, in most cases, of themselves determine it. The Senate will be elected absolutely and exclusively by the State legislatures. [destroyed by 17th amendment] Even the House of Representatives, though drawn immediately from the people, will be chosen very much under the influence of that class of men, whose influence over the people obtains for themselves an election into the State legislatures. Thus, each of the principal branches of the federal government will owe its existence more or less to the favor of the State governments, and must consequently feel a dependence, which is much more likely to beget a disposition too obsequious than too overbearing towards them.
On the other side, the component parts of the State governments will in no instance be indebted for their appointment to the direct agency of the federal government, and very little, if at all, to the local influence of its members. The number of individuals employed under the Constitution of the United States will be much smaller than the number employed under the particular States. There will consequently be less of personal influence on the side of the former than of the latter. The members of the legislative, executive, and judiciary departments of thirteen and more States, the justices of peace, officers of militia, ministerial officers of justice, with all the county, corporation, and town officers, for three millions and more of people, intermixed, and having particular acquaintance with every class and circle of people, must exceed, beyond all proportion, both in number and influence, those of every description who will be employed in the administration of the federal system. Compare the members of the three great departments of the thirteen States, excluding from the judiciary department the justices of peace, with the members of the corresponding departments of the single government of the Union; compare the militia officers of three millions of people with the military and marine officers of any establishment which is within the compass of probability, or, I may add, of possibility, and in this view alone, we may pronounce the advantage of the States to be decisive. If the federal government is to have collectors of revenue, the State governments will have theirs also. And as those of the former will be principally on the seacoast, and not very numerous, whilst those of the latter will be spread over the face of the country, and will be very numerous, the advantage in this view also lies on the same side.
It is true, that the Confederacy is to possess, and may exercise, the power of collecting internal as well as external taxes throughout the States; but it is probable that this power will not be resorted to, except for supplemental purposes of revenue; that an option will then be given to the States to supply their quotas by previous collections of their own; and that the eventual collection, under the immediate authority of the Union, will generally be made by the officers, and according to the rules, appointed by the several States. Indeed it is extremely probable, that in other instances, particularly in the organization of the judicial power, the officers of the States will be clothed with the correspondent authority of the Union. Should it happen, however, that separate collectors of internal revenue should be appointed under the federal government, the influence of the whole number would not bear a comparison with that of the multitude of State officers in the opposite scale. Within every district to which a federal collector would be allotted, there would not be less than thirty or forty, or even more, officers of different descriptions, and many of them persons of character and weight, whose influence would lie on the side of the State. The powers delegated by the proposed Constitution to the federal government are few and defined. Those which are to remain in the State governments are numerous and indefinite. The former will be exercised principally on external objects, as war, peace, negotiation, and foreign commerce; with which last the power of taxation will, for the most part, be connected.
Today the Federal Government
employs over 4 million people.
California employs 235 thousand, and CA is the top. Pennselvania, #5 employs 98K. Our Founders certainly never imagined the Leviathan that the Federal Government has become -- as is well covered in "
Suicide of the West", they envisioned a limited GOVERNMENT which keeps basic interstate rules and handles internationa affairs and defense. What we have now is an UNlimited STATE which increasingly intrudes on every aspect of personal life. The CO2 that you breath out is controlled as a "pollutant" by an unelected federal agency -- the EPA.
So the fact of the matter is that the authors of our Constitution clearly erred in providing the Federal Government with vastly excessive power, because they assumed that The People as well as the State Governments would be a far more effective counterbalance to the will to power of the Federal Government than they turned out to be. Sadly, they were bought off with the promise of all the things the Federal Government promised it would "give" them (using their neighbors and future generations money).
The other point that the Federalist Papers make clear is the danger of having a "Bill of Rights".
It has been several times truly remarked, that bills of rights are in their origin, stipulations between kings and their subjects, abridgments of prerogative in favor of privilege, reservations of rights not surrendered to the prince. Such was Magna Charta, obtained by the Barons, sword in hand, from king John. Such were the subsequent confirmations of that charter by subsequent princes. Such was the petition of rightassented to by Charles the First, in the beginning of his reign. Such also was the declaration of right presented by the lords and commons to the prince of Orange in 1688, and afterwards thrown into the form of an act of parliament, called the bill of rights. It is evident, therefore, that according to their primitive signification, they have no application to constitutions professedly founded upon the power of the people, and executed by their immediate representatives and servants. Here, in strictness, the people surrender nothing, and as they retain every thing, they have no need of particular reservations. "We the people of the United States, to secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity, do ordain and establish this constitution for the United States of America." Here is a better recognition of popular rights than volumes of those aphorisms which make the principal figure in several of our state bills of rights, and which would sound much better in a treatise of ethics than in a constitution of government.
But a minute detail of particular rights is certainly far less applicable to a constitution like that under consideration, which is merely intended to regulate the general political interests of the nation, than to a constitution which has the regulation of every species of personal and private concerns. If therefore the loud clamours against the plan of the convention on this score, are well founded, no epithets of reprobation will be too strong for the constitution of this state. But the truth is, that both of them contain all, which in relation to their objects, is reasonably to be desired.
I go further, and affirm that bills of rights, in the sense and in the extent in which they are contended for, are not only unnecessary in the proposed constitution, but would even be dangerous. They would contain various exceptions to powers which are not granted; and on this very account, would afford a colourable pretext to claim more than were granted. For why declare that things shall not be done which there is no power to do? Why for instance, should it be said, that the liberty of the press shall not be restrained, when no power is given by which restrictions may be imposed? I will not contend that such a provision would confer a regulating power; but it is evident that it would furnish, to men disposed to usurp, a plausible pretence for claiming that power. They might urge with a semblance of reason, that the constitution ought not to be charged with the absurdity of providing against the abuse of an authority, which was not given, and that the provision against restraining the liberty of the press afforded a clear implication, that a power to prescribe proper regulations concerning it, was intended to be vested in the national government. This may serve as a specimen of the numerous handles which would be given to the doctrine of constructive powers, by the indulgence of an injudicious zeal for bills of rights.
The Federal Government was never granted any power to restrict the press, so there is no reason to codify a "right" to such a thing at the federal level! The States OTOH **MAY** decide to apply some level of restriction, and as the Constitution was written, the Federal Government would have nothing to say on this. Since we are talking 1st Amendment issues, take the freedom to establish a state church ... something that existed well into the 1800's in the US.
If you go and take a look at this article, you can see how prophetic Hamilton was on the Bill of Rights issue.
The bill might be pointless grandstanding, but it's just one of many pointless pieces of grandstanding that signal the revival of nullification as a legal theory in the Obama years, mostly among conservatives who have claimed that states could disregard duly passed federal laws on matters like health care or gun control. (Liberals have indulged too, demanding that the feds not enforce drug laws in states that have legalized marijuana.)
Once the Bill of Rights was established, the Federal Government decided that it was it's job to "guarantee" those "rights" as IT decreed them to be -- powers that the original Constitution never granted to it in the first place. As Hamilton put it so well ...
I go further, and affirm that bills of rights, in the sense and in the extent in which they are contended for, are not only unnecessary in the proposed constitution, but would even be dangerous. They would contain various exceptions to powers which are not granted; and on this very account, would afford a colourable pretext to claim more than were granted.
Even worse, if you are not a member of TP "The Party-D", then you get the wondrous deal where the nullification of federal marjuana laws, immigration laws, and gun rights ( there is still no 50 state carry even though the "right" is in the Bill of Rights) works just fine, but a state can't "infringe" on the created from whole cloth "right" to abortion in any way shape or form. Lovely.
The Federalists gave WAY too much power to the Federal Government and had WAY too much faith in "We the People", as well as the state governments to jealously defend their rights against the ever grasping for power federal behemoth.
There are not an easy read, but I agree with those that chided me, they ARE a very worthy read -- if only to rub it in one more time how much we lost when we lost America for BOistan.
